Introduction
Crude oil prices skyrocketed from $92 a barrel in January 2008 to hit a record high of $147 a barrel on July 11, 2008, before suddenly collapsing to less than $40 a barrel in December 2008. During the financial crisis oil prices have steadily recovered to pre-crisis levels. According to El-Erian (2012) , central bank quantitative easing policies can be "seen by some as a contributor to higher commodity prices, especially oil and precious metals" (see also Hamilton, 2009 , for a related point). This paper sheds further light on the determinants of energy prices by examining whether, and to what extent, the Federal Reserve conventional and unconventional monetary policy affects energy prices. This relationship is an important topic for several reasons. From a central banking perspective, oil price dynamics affects both inflation and real activity. For instance, in a June 2008 speech Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke (Bernanke, 2008) singled out the role of energy prices among the main drivers of inflation dynamics, underscoring the importance for policy-makers of understanding the factors that drive those changes. Traders are likely to be equally interested in this topic since monetary policy decisions are often associated with large asset price movements. It is therefore important for retail and institutional investors to understand the link between the Federal Reserve monetary policy and asset prices in formulating effective trading and hedging strategies and portfolio allocation decisions. Finally, for a market monitoring perspective, it is important to decompose changes in energy prices into their fundamental contributors, including monetary policy, U.S. macroeconomic fundamentals and oil supply. Little is known, however, about the realtime effects of conventional and unconventional monetary policy on oil prices using an event-study approach with intraday data. This paper contributes to the extant literature in three main aspects. First, consistent with the efficient market hypothesis that asset prices only react to new information, this work carefully identifies the surprise component, rather than the mere presence, of the Federal Reserve's Large-Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) announcements. The distinction between anticipated and unanticipated LSAP announcements is essential to properly estimate, and especially not understate, the effectiveness of asset purchases. For instance, as documented by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenson (2011, Figure 4) , the response of the 10-year Treasury rate to the FOMC announcement of $600 billion of Treasury purchases is somewhat muted. This finding suggests that this LSAP announcement was mostly anticipated by market participants, and may have already been priced in before the actual announcement. Second, the LSAP news is incorporated into a formal regression framework, thus controlling for the unanticipated policy rate decision and statement regarding the future policy path. As noted by Woodford (2012) , "the two dates considered by Gagnon, Raskin, Remache and Sack (2011) on which there were the largest declines in long-term bond yields -accounting for 73 basis points out of the 2 cumulative 91-basis-point decline that they report -were both dates on which there were very important statements about the funds rate target." Specifically, on December 16, 2008, the funds rate target was cut from 1.0 percent to the 0-25 basis point target band, and on March 18, 2009, the FOMC announced that it expected to maintain the low level of the funds rate "for an extended period" (rather than "for some time"). Attributing all of the declines in long-term bond yields on these days to the LSAP news substantially over-estimates the financial market impact of asset purchases. Third, to better understand the transmission channels through which monetary policy affect energy prices (e.g. economic growth and exchange rate channels), I look at the high-frequency response of oil prices quoted in different currencies.
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, I show that the release of the FOMC statement induces significant "higher than normal" volatility of crude oil futures prices, and their trading volumes, compared with non-event days. This result suggests that the contents of the FOMC statements are not always completely anticipated. Hence, the release of the statement causes market participants to revise their expectations, and determines considerable portfolio reshuffling. A potential drawback of the above approach is that it cannot determine whether energy prices move in the direction of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy.
To address this shortcoming, I identify multi-dimensional indicators of monetary policy news which capture information relating to policy rate decisions, the future path of policy, and announcements of future large-scale asset purchases. Estimation results show that monetary policy news have economically important and highly significant effects. For instance, in a 1-h window around the FOMC press release a hypothetical unanticipated 100-basis-point hike in the federal funds target rate is associated with 2.7% decline in crude light oil price and 1.8% decrease in heating oil price. This paper also documents economically important effects of asset purchases on oil prices. In a narrow window around the FOMC meeting the cumulative financial market impact of the unanticipated announcement of asset purchases in terms of their federal funds-rate-equivalent, i.e. change in the funds rate that would have the same financial market impact as a given quantity of asset purchases, is substantial. Specifically, the impact of asset purchases ranges between 8 (for natural gas), 111 (for heating oil), and 155 basis points (for crude oil). These point estimates are, however, surrounded by considerable uncertainty.
Second, I show that monetary policy surprises have no statistically significant effect on energy prices quoted in different currencies. More specifically, the high-frequency impact of monetary policy on the dollar price of oil is exactly offset by the response of the U.S. dollar exchange rate vis-à-vis with any other major currency. This finding suggests that most of the reaction of oil prices can be attributed to the exchange rate channel. Third, high-frequency oil prices significantly react to U.S. macroeconomic surprises, such as industrial production, nonfarm payrolls, and consumer confidence, and to inventory news. The daily response of oil prices is, however, never significantly different from zero (except for inventory news). This finding confirms that by using intraday data the precision of the point estimates is greatly enhanced compared to those obtained by a lower-frequency 3 (daily) regression model (see, inter alia, Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega, 2003, and Beechey and Wright, 2009 , for similar results). To sum up, the results of this paper are not consistent with the hypothesis that energy prices are predetermined with respect to monetary policy and U.S. economic fundamentals. These findings have important policy implications for macroeconomic modelling. In particular, in a monthly vector autoregression (VAR) model, the recursive identification that assumes no feedback from domestic macroeconomic shocks to the price of energy with the same month (see, inter alia, Blanchard and Gali, 2010, and Leduc and Sill, 2004 , and the references contained therein) is not supported by the data. Moreover, in contrast to most of the existing literature (see, e.g., Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2006; Kormilitsina, 2011; Natal, 2012) the empirical findings suggest that oil prices should be treated as endogenous variables in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models.
By looking at the financial market impact of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy, this paper is related to different strands of the literature. A number of studies investigate the influence of the Federal Reserve's unanticipated policy rate decisions on U.S. asset prices.
1 This strand of research has reached a consensus that U.S. asset prices respond strongly to unanticipated fed funds target rate decisions.
A number of recent papers analyze issues relating to monetary policy and commodity prices (see, e.g., Frankel, 2008 , and the references therein). Two recent contributions look at the impact of monetary surprises on energy prices using an event-study approach, as I do in this study. Glick and Leduc (2011) study the daily response of long-term interest rates, exchange rates, and the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) and its components. They document that on days of LSAP announcements the GSCI, and particularly the GSCI Energy, sharply fell. As I discuss below in panel (b) of Table 1 , this surprising result is entirely driven by the use of lower (daily) frequency data. A similar approach has been applied to study the impact of conventional monetary policy by Basistha and Kurov (2012) . They find a negative and highly significant response of intraday energy prices to target surprises. This paper shares this finding and goes further by considering the impact of both conventional and unconventional, e.g. asset purchases, monetary policy. shock that is associated to an increase in the commodity price index and all of its major components.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset. Section 3 contains the main results. Section 4 provides extensive robustness analysis and comparison with results in the existing literature. Section 5 offers some concluding thoughts.
Data

Energy futures data
The high-frequency energy prices consist of 5-min quotes of futures data on light sweet crude oil (also Rigobon and Sack, 2008) . Second, it is possible to recover the whole term structure of expectations. Finally, expectations are available also for unscheduled FOMC meetings.
Monetary policy surprises are divided into three categories:
i) A Target shock is defined as the difference between the announced target federal funds rate and market participants' expectations.
ii) A Path shock captures revisions to the future path of monetary policy.
iii) An asset purchase shock measures the surprise component of asset purchase announcements.
Since market participants are unlikely to respond to monetary policy actions that are already anticipated, distinguishing between expected and unexpected policy decisions is essential to properly estimate the financial market impact of policy. As standard in the literature (e.g. Kuttner, 2001) I use federal funds futures data to extract market-based measures of monetary policy expectations. 6 These futures contracts are traded on the Chicago Board of Trade exchange and their settlement price at maturity is based on the average effective overnight federal funds rate that is realized for the calendar month specified in the contract. Since the futures rate on a given date would embody the average of realized funds rates through that date and expectations about the rates prevailing after that date, the unanticipated, or surprise, target funds rate change from federal funds futures contracts can be computed as follows:
where ∆ is the change in the current month federal funds futures rate in a narrow window around FOMC announcements (spanning from 5-min prior to 25-min after the policy announcement), is the day of the month of the meeting, and is the total number of days in that month. Since at the end of the month the scale factor in Equation (1) becomes very large and could unduly magnify targeting errors or possible changes in the bid-ask 6 spread, in the last five days of the month I define the variable TS as the unscaled change in the next-month federal funds futures contract. Note that by using intraday data to identify the target shock, the endogeneity problem (i.e. policy decisions, backed out from federal funds futures, may be simultaneously influenced by movements in other asset prices) is substantially reduced. The validity in Equation (1) to compute the surprise target rate change critically depends on the assumption that the risk premium is time-invariant. As noted by Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) "the one-day change in the federal funds futures rate around FOMC announcements seems to be much more robust to the presence of risk premia". Since I consider a 30-min window bracketing the FOMC announcements, I can safely assume that risk premia, which move primarily at lower, business-cycle frequencies, are "differenced out".
I compute the surprise component about the future path of monetary policy by using the same methodology developed by Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) . More specifically, let the factor model representation for be expressed in the following form:
where denotes a matrix, with rows corresponding to the dates of FOMC decisions, and columns corresponding to asset prices, with each element of reporting the asset price change in the tight (30-min) window around the corresponding monetary policy announcement. is a matrix of unobserved factors (with ), Λ is a matrix of factor loadings, and is a matrix of white noise disturbances. As in Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) , I use the price changes of five futures contracts to pin down the matrix in Equation (2): the current-month federal funds futures rate, the federal funds futures rate for the month containing the next FOMC meeting (with scale adjustment for timing of FOMC meetings within the month), and the two-, three-, and four-quarter-ahead eurodollar futures rates. I find that for the sample period January 1999 -June 2011 the first two factors explain around 96% of the variation in the dependent variables, compared to 92%
as originally found by Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) for the sample period February 1990 -December 2004. Again, as in Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) , to allow for a more structural interpretation of these unobserved factors, I rotate them so that the first factor, Target, corresponds to surprise component of the current federal funds rate target, and the second factor, Path, corresponds to the unexpected change in interest rate expectations over the coming year that are not driven by changes in the current funds rate.
On December 
Rosa (2012) contains a detailed discussion of the caveats of this methodology, and reports the values of LSAP surprises, together with a few examples based on the FT's commentaries to provide a brief rationale for the coding of the LSAP announcements. Note that to reduce the chance of potential misclassification, and in line with the work in content analysis (see, e.g., Holsti, 1969) , two other persons have coded the FT's stories independently, producing the same ranking of surprises. This finding confirms that by using intraday data the precision of the estimation results is greatly enhanced compared to those obtained by a lower-frequency (daily) data. i.e. 2.15 PM EDT. A ratio above one can be interpreted as the monetary policy news inducing "higher than normal" volatility and trading activity on FOMC meeting days compared to non-event days. Large and small filled squares denote significance of the differences at the two-sided 1 and 5 percent level respectively. Since asset price returns and the ratio of trading volumes may not be normally distributed, the test statistic proposed by Levene (1960) is used to test the null hypothesis of equal variances in each subgroup, and the Wilcoxon signed ranks test (see Newbold, 1988 ) is used to test the null hypothesis that the median ratio equals one. In line with the existing literature that documents a positive contemporaneous relation between volume and volatility (see, e.g., Karpoff, 1987 , and more recently Giot, Laurent and Petitjean, 2010, for detailed surveys), I expect that also volumes respond to the release of FOMC statements. Two interesting features can be inferred from Figure 1 .
First, the evidence of volatility increase during the pre-announcement phase is tenuous and not significantly different compared to non-announcement days. On the other side, trading activity tends to be lower prior to announcements, displaying the so called "calm-before-the-storm" effect (Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine, 1998).
Second, news about monetary policy tends to induce significantly "higher than normal" volatility and trading volumes up to 40-min after the monetary policy announcements. 
Regression analysis
An important shortcoming of the above approach based on volatility is that it cannot determine whether asset prices move in the direction of the Federal Reserve's policy surprises. For this reason, another more informative approach consists in estimating the following equations:
where is the intraday futures return, i.e. the percentage change in energy prices from 10-min before to 50-min after the event. This is a conservative choice of window size, and is based on the assumption that the price adjustment in the conditional mean of energy prices is complete within 50-min of the monetary policy announcement. The variable TS stands for the Target shock computed in Equation (1), the variables Target and Path factors are computed in (2), and as indicated by Equation (3) the variable LSAPS stands for the surprise component of LSAP announcements. The error term represents other factors that affect asset prices on event times. These factors are assumed to be orthogonal to the explanatory variables of the regression. Each regression is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with White-t statistics (White, 1980) to account for heteroskedasticity in the residuals. Rosa, 2011a, b, for stock prices and exchange rates) document that the Path factor has a much greater impact compared to target surprises, whereas Hausman and Wongswan (2011) find that international stock markets respond mainly to the target surprises. The most interesting aspect of Table 2 is the estimates of the effects of the LSAP news on oil prices. The coefficient of the LSAP shock is negative, and highly significant. An unanticipated dovish LSAP announcement is, on average, associated with an increase in the front-month WTI futures prices of roughly 2%. This result implies that in a narrow window around the FOMC meeting the cumulative financial market impact of the LSAP program in terms of their federal funds-rate equivalent corresponds to an unanticipated cut in the federal funds target rate of 155 basis points. These point estimates are, however, surrounded by considerable uncertainty. 10 To shed further light on the economic importance of the effects of asset purchases on energy prices, I have compared the goodness of fit, as measured by the adjusted R 2 , of Equation (6) to the baseline specification that includes only a constant and the target surprise. By including the surprise component of LSAP announcements, the adjusted R 2 of the crude oil regression substantially increases from 5% to 8%, suggesting that the effect of the LSAP shock is not only statistically different from zero and of the "expected" sign, but also quantitatively important. 10 The cumulative stimulus of the LSAP program, expressed in federal funds rate-equivalent, is computed as • / , where N is the sum of LSAP ternary dummies, and I multiply the ratio by 100 to express it in basis points. To assess the degree of uncertainty in this point estimate, I compute empirical confidence bands using simulations. More specifically, I take 10,000 draws from the joint distribution of , , and compute the above proportion implied for each asset pair. Finally, I take the 5% and 95% percentiles.
Monetary policy can affect oil prices through two different channels: economic growth and exchange rates.
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First, a contractionary monetary policy shock leads to persistent decline of the U.S. economic activity, thus reducing demand for all goods, including commodities and oil, and consequently lowering oil prices. Second, oil, as well as many other commodities, are priced in U.S. dollars. Hence, as noted by Reinhart (2011) , oil producers care about the current and expected future purchasing power of the dollar. An unanticipated cut in the federal funds target rate leads to a depreciation of the U.S. dollar, and possibly to higher inflation. These effects erode the purchasing power of the foreign producers of commodities who have to increase the nominal price of oil to keep up with that erosion. To disentangle the relative importance of these two channels, I look at the highfrequency response of oil prices quoted in different currencies. Table 3 shows that monetary policy surprises have no statistically significant effect on oil prices quoted in euro. More specifically, the high-frequency impact of monetary policy on the dollar price of oil is offset by the response of the U.S. dollar exchange rate vis-à-vis with the euro. This finding holds more generally for oil prices quoted in British pound, Canadian dollar, Swiss franc, and Japanese yen (results available from the author upon request), and suggests that most of the reaction of oil prices can be attributed to the exchange rate channel. 
4.
Robustness checks
Comparing intraday and daily results
As argued by Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) , Beechey and Wright (2009) and others, intraday data may provide more precise point estimates of announcement effects than can be obtained with lowerfrequency (daily) data. To assess the extent of the additional information content of employing intraday (5-min) oil price data, I estimate Equations (4)-(6) using daily returns as the dependent variable (Bloomberg ticker: CL1 Comdty) in place of oil price returns computed in a 1-h window around the FOMC announcement time.
Specifically, I consider a "daily" window, which begins with the financial market close the day before the policy announcement and ends with the financial market close the day of the policy announcement. Table 4 shows the estimation results. The sign of the Target shock coefficient remains, as expected, negative: a hypothetical unanticipated 100-basis-point hike in the federal funds target rate is associated with roughly 1.4% decline in oil 12 prices. The coefficient is, however, insignificantly different from zero. Consistent with Table 1 (panel B) , the coefficient of the LSAP shock becomes positive, and highly significant: an unanticipated dovish LSAP announcement is associated with a decline in crude oil prices of roughly 2%. This result is consistent with the findings of Glick and Leduc (2011), and indicates that by using intraday data the precision of the point estimates is greatly enhanced compared to those obtained by a lower-frequency (daily) data. Table 4 here Kilian and Vega (2011) test the identifying assumption that energy prices are predetermined with respect to U.S. macroeconomic aggregates by using an event-study approach and regressing daily energy price returns on U.S. macroeconomic news. They find no statistical evidence that energy prices respond instantaneously to macroeconomic news, and hence their results support the use of delay restrictions for identification. 12 Given the previous finding about the additional informational content of using intraday data to obtain more efficient point estimates, I reexamine the high-frequency responsiveness of oil crude prices to macroeconomic news using 5-min data. 
, ,
where stands for the intraday (i.e., the percentage change in energy prices from 10-min before to 50-min after the event) and daily crude oil futures return, the variable stands for the macroeconomic surprise at time .
Equation (7) is estimated for all macro news except for the case of the Employment Report surprises, when
Equation (8) is estimated. The rest of the notation is the same as before. The coefficient represents the average impact of a one standard deviation change in the macroeconomic surprise over the 1-h intraday interval. announcements, such as industrial production, nonfarm payrolls and consumer confidence, have a statistically significant effect on oil price returns. More specifically, better-than-expected job growth and lower-thanexpected inventory releases are associated with an increase in oil prices. The most interesting aspect of Table 5 (right panel) is, however, the fact that the corresponding confidence interval using daily data is much larger (bottom table) , and no news except inventories remains significant. Hence, the results of Kilian and Vega (2011) seem to be entirely driven by the loss of precision due to use of lower-frequency (daily) data. To take into proper consideration the size distortion due to data mining in asymptotic test (e.g. repeated applications of the same t test to alternative regressors), inferential results are also drawn from bootstrap distributions generated under the null hypothesis that energy prices do not respond to news (see Kilian and Vega, 2011, and White, 2000 , for the technical details on this bootstrap procedure). 14 The simulation results are based on 10,000 bootstrap replications. The results remain very similar, indicating that the conclusions reached using heteroskedasticityrobust standard errors are not importantly influenced by the inferential procedure. show that crude oil futures prices significantly react to the target factor and LSAP shock, but not to the path factor. The magnitude of the response to the Target rate shock is marginally larger in the pre-crisis sample. For instance, a hypothetical unanticipated 100-basis-point hike in the federal funds target rate is associated with roughly 4% drop in crude oil prices between 1999 and 2007, and only 1.2% decline during the financial crisis.
Finally, I examine the high-frequency response of the front-month futures on heating oil and natural gas to monetary policy news. The response of energy prices to Target shocks is negative, and significant, whereas the impact of the Path factor and LSAP surprises is insignificant. A hypothetical unanticipated 100-basis-point hike in the federal funds target rate is associated with 1.8% decline in heating oil futures prices and 2.7% decline in natural gas futures. Since the correlation between crude oil and heating oil futures 5-min returns is roughly 0.5, the price of heating oil may respond to monetary policy news because its price is closely tied to the price of crude oil. I also examine the high-frequency response of the term structure of oil prices to monetary surprises by looking at the front-, second-, third-and sixth-month futures contracts. This exercise is interesting because oil futures provide a forward-looking measure of expected future oil prices (see, e.g., Chinn and Coibion, 2010, for evidence that futures prices are unbiased and accurate predictor of subsequent spot prices). Estimation results
show that the short-end of the term structure is more sensitive to monetary surprises than the longer-end, suggesting that far-ahead oil prices may not be influenced by monetary policy. An alternative interpretation of this finding is, however, that far-ahead contracts are not very liquid, and thus do not react to news.
Conclusions
The high-frequency response of asset prices to monetary and macroeconomic news announcements represents a rich source of information to better understand the financial market impact of economic fundamentals, and may be the closest thing that can be obtained in macroeconomics to a natural experiment.
This paper examines the effects of the Federal Reserve conventional and unconventional monetary policy on the level, the volatility, and trading volumes of energy futures using an event study with intraday data for crude light and heating oil, and natural gas. I document that oil prices respond negatively to target surprises and unanticipated asset purchases announcements. For instance, I find that, on average, a hypothetical unanticipated 100-basis-point hike in the Federal funds rate target is associated with roughly a 3% decrease in WTI oil prices. I also show that in a narrow window around the FOMC meeting the cumulative financial market impact of the Federal Reserve LSAP program on crude oil is equivalent to an unanticipated cut in the federal funds target rate of 155 basis points. The channel through which monetary policy affects oil prices is mostly by affecting the value of the U.S. dollar. This study also re-examines the identifying assumption that energy prices are predetermined with respect to U.S. macroeconomic aggregates. In contrast to Kilian and Vega (2011) results (based on daily data), I show that oil prices significantly react to U.S. macroeconomic surprises, such as industrial production, nonfarm payrolls, and consumer confidence, and to inventory news. This finding confirms that intraday data have the potential to give more precise estimates of announcement effects than what can be estimated with daily data.
Building on the results of this paper, a key direction for future research would be to broaden the set of news, including news on weather conditions, geopolitical developments, and the growth outlook of emerging market economies. This allows to better decompose changes in energy prices into several fundamental contributors. Furthermore, the findings of this work, together with the evidence provided in the existing
Figure 1 The volatility and trading volumes of crude oil (WTI) futures around FOMC announcements
The figure (top panel) plots the ratio between (i) the standard deviation of the 5-min crude oil (WTI) futures returns around the FOMC announcement release and (ii) the standard deviation of the 5-min crude oil (WTI) futures returns on control days (the same weekdays and hours of the previous and following week of the FOMC meeting day). The figure (bottom panel) plots the median ratio between (i) the 5-min volumes on release days, and the average of (ii) the 5-min volumes on the same weekdays (of the previous and following week of the release day of the FOMC minutes) and hours but on nonannouncement days. The sample is January 1999 -June 2011. The interval spans from 1 h before to 2 h after the event time. The vertical line is placed at the release time of the FOMC statement (see Rosa, 2012 , for the exact time stamps of the FOMC meetings). Large and small filled squares denote significance of the differences at the two-sided 1 and 5 percent level respectively. Rosa (2012) . The econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares with Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors in brackets. The row "Cum. impact of LSAP" reports the cumulative impact of the unexpected component of the LSAP announcements in a narrow window around the FOMC meetings expressed in federal funds target rate cut (in basis points), whereas the row "90% confidence interval" reports its 90% confidence interval. The superscripts *** , Rosa (2012) . The econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares with Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors. The row "Cum. impact of LSAP" reports the cumulative impact of the unexpected component of the LSAP announcements in a narrow window around the FOMC meetings expressed in federal funds target rate cut (in basis points), whereas the row "90% confidence interval" reports its 90% confidence interval. The superscripts *** , The table reports the results from regressions of intraday percentage changes in crude oil (WTI) futures prices (from 10-min before the event to 50-min after) on a constant, and the standardized macroeconomic or oil news. Observations are on days of scheduled macroeconomic releases, January 1999 -June 2011. The econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares with Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors. The signs of the announcement surprises in the countercyclical indicators (unemployment rate and initial jobless claims) denoted with the † symbol have been flipped. The nonfarm payrolls and unemployment rate are always announced simultaneously. Also the inventory figures from the Department of Energy (DoE) are always announced simultaneously. The acronym "SA" stands for seasonally adjusted. Data-mining robust p-values are based on a parametric bootstrap approach under the null hypothesis of no predictability (one-sided test). The "Adj. R 2 " (aligned with Nonfarm payrolls) stands for the adjusted R 2 of the estimation of a baseline specification that includes a constant, nonfarm payroll and unemployment rate surprises as explanatory variables. The robust p-values (see Kilian and Vega, 2011) are based on 10,000 bootstrap replications. The superscripts *** , ** , and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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